A number of recent studies argue that misallocation of resources across fi rms is a prime cause of underdevelopment. Standard theory implies that if domestic capital markets are functioning well, the marginal product of capital (MPK) of each fi rm equals the market interest rate. If fi rms instead borrow at diff erent interest rates, maybe due to diff erential access to informal fi nance or due to political connections, capital is likely to be misallocated and the MPK will diff er across fi rms.
ing the incentive of owners to reinvest. Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) fi nd exactly such behavior in Russia and Ukraine after the breakdown of communism.
We ask two questions in this chapter: What is the extent of capital misallocation within African countries, and why does misallocation vary across these countries? We quantify capital misallocation across manufacturing establishments within ten African countries in 2005 and 2006 using establishment-level data from the World Bank Productivity and Investment Climate Survey.
1 This is a unique survey undertaken as part of a major World Bank initiative between 1999 and 2007 in eighty developed and developing countries around the world. The main purpose of the survey was to identify obstacles to fi rm performance and growth; hence the survey not only asks questions on fi rm characteristics and outcomes, but also asks many questions on the perceived severity of obstacles such as crime, infrastructure, and fi nancing constraints. Having fi rms' own perceptions of fi nancing constraints is a big advantage of the data set because much of the literature infers fi nancing constraints from companies' fi nancial statements using various modeling and econometric techniques. This data set has been used by, among others, Beck et al. (2006) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) , who show that these self-perceived constraints actually bind and hurt fi rm growth. Our data set has information on small and large, as well as listed and private fi rms, which allows us to control for some important fi rm characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic study undertaken that calculates the extent of misallocation and its determinants for Africa using comparable fi rm-level data from many countries.
In the literature, there are various approaches employed for calculating the extent of misallocation of capital across fi rms within a country. As stated above, one of the advantages of our data set is that it allows us to compare the interest rates fi rms are paying with the market interest rate. This is our starting point because we have data on the interest rates each fi rm pays on loans. We show that many fi rms borrow at rates up to 30-40 percent, suggesting that fi rms have even higher marginal returns to capital. 2 We calculate the MPK for each fi rm using fi rm-level output and capital stocks under the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas (with parameters calibrated from the literature). Doing so reveals that the distribution of the MPK varies a lot within most African countries. This indicates that capital is ineffi ciently allocated-a fact that cannot be derived from country-level aggregate fi gures. We next calculate a measure of mis-compare the statistics calculated for African countries to corresponding statistics calculated for a selection of non-African countries at diff erent levels of development-namely, Germany, Ireland, Spain, South Korea, and India. This comparison reveals that standard deviations across fi rms of all our misallocation measures are much larger in Africa. For example, the standard deviation of the interest rate is 2-5 times higher in African countries than in European countries and the standard deviation of the MPK is about 40 percent higher in African countries (and in India) than in European countries. More than 50 percent of fi rms in Africa report that access to fi nance is a severe obstacle, while very few fi rms in Europe report this as a severe obstacle.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reports on our fi eld trip to Ghana, a country with a high level of misallocation. Section 5.3 describes our data in detail, while section 5.4 presents results from our empirical analysis. Section 5.5 concludes.
Observations from Investigators' Trip to Ghana
The authors visited Ghana in May 2011 and interviewed several people familiar with local conditions, such as academics and foreign entrepreneurs. Foreign fi rms are concentrated in Accra, the capital of Ghana, in a free trade zone that has reliable electricity (although many companies in Ghana rely on generators) and, most importantly, a large modern harbor that allows for easy shipping. Foreign entrepreneurs fi nance investments with retained earnings or nonlocal fi nancing because contract enforcement in Africa is weak. Most projects are done with a 50 percent down payment up front. The main attraction by far of investing in Ghana (relative to alternative subSaharan countries) is political stability, although a reliable local workforce is another plus. It was mentioned that workers from some other African countries are considered less reliable. One multinational corporation located production in Ghana due to local demand for its product from other foreign companies operating in Ghana and sub-Saharan Africa. This corporation was originally shipping its product from an affi liate outside of Africa but could not keep up with the orders-the motivation for shipping from afar was put as: "Nobody wants to buy something made in Africa because quality is perceived to be poor."
Foreign companies have to obey a 70 percent local content requirement, which means 70 percent of the workforce should be Ghanaians. This constitutes a problem because the local workforce lacks basic skills; for example, plumbers are hard to fi nd. The companies bring in high-tech personnel from India and the Philippines or from the United States (although Americans sometimes do not want to stay) to train the local workforce. This, however, is costly, being very time intensive. Foreign entrepreneurs try to circumvent the 70 percent requirement by other means (one example given was plead-ing with offi cials) in order to get things done. Companies import all capital goods and intermediate goods from the United States and other developed countries.
There was general agreement that access to capital through formal channels, such as banks, is severely limited in particular due to lack of clear property rights to land. Being unable to use land as collateral makes it diffi cult for small businesses to get loans. Microloans (informal) are often available but annual rates are very high, often above 50 percent. One US multinational company owner said that the main reason, more important than infrastructure, for investing in a factory in the free trade zone was that the land is owned by the government-the company paid for a forty-sevenyear lease in advance. Local fi rms are shut out from fi nancial intermediation and borrow from family or local unoffi cial lenders. Banks mainly serve the government.
Small-scale corruption is another major problem. (Maybe also large-scale corruption, although we did not learn about that.) Mango producers in the north of Ghana were not able to get fruit to the market in Accra without paying prohibitive bribes at police check points, which also slow down trucking on the already inadequate roads (by US standards; according to the foreign entrepreneur, the roads are good by Africa standards). As we understood, police bribes are not particularly large, maybe a few dollars, but with enough checkpoints, it becomes unprofi table to transport low-margin goods over any substantial distance. In the descriptive statistics tables to be discussed later, we show numbers for Ghana and for African countries pooled.
Data

Productivity and Investment Climate Survey
The fi rm-level data comes from the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey of the World Bank, 5 administered in roughly parallel fashion to enterprizes in twenty-one countries in Africa, mostly in face-to-face interviews. The data set provides a basis for making country comparisons of investment climate and severity of constraints aff ecting fi rms. It captures fi rms' perceptions of key constraints in the business environment that shape operational and investment decisions, as well as several quantitative indices of fi rm experience.
The fi rst roll out of surveys was done in 2006 for thirteen countries: Burundi, Congo, Botswana, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Guinea-Conakry (or Republic of Guinea), Namibia, Gambia, Mauritania, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda. In 2007, a second roll out was conducted in eight additional countries: South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Mali, Ghana, 5. The data and related documents are available at http:// www .enterprisesurveys .org/. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 Senegal, Kenya, and Nigeria. Questionnaires of the two roll outs are not systematically diff erent, except that the second questionnaire generally has more detailed questions. The World Bank also surveys some developed and emerging market countries, but the structure of the questionnaires is somewhat diff erent from that used in the African surveys. For comparison with Africa, we choose Germany, India, Ireland, South Korea, and Spain. 6 The data set for African countries, merging the two roll outs, has information on 12,752 establishments. For the comparison countries, we have data for 1,196 German, 2,286 Indian, 501 Irish, 598 South Korean, and 606 Spanish establishments. Enterprizes with fi ve to nineteen, twenty to ninety-nine, and over one hundred employees are labeled small, medium, and large, respectively.
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The Productivity and Investment Climate Survey comprises four sets of questionnaires, which are particularly designed for the following sectors: manufacturing, retail, residual (out of manufacturing and retail), and micro (also called the informal sector). Each questionnaire has several sections in which detailed information is given. In related surveys, entrepreneurs provided general information including legal status (e.g., proprietorship); the percentage owned by the largest shareholder; private, foreign, or government ownership; sex and ethnic origin of the majority owner; level of education and experience of the top manager; when the fi rm was established; and whether it was formally registered (section A). The survey also provides information on sales and exports (section C), supplies and import (section D), capacity and innovation (section E), investment climate constraints (section F), infrastructure (G), confl ict resolution/ legal environment (section H), business-government relations (section I), labor regulation (section J), fi nance (section K), and productivity (section L). The data was collected using similar survey-sampling methodologies because one of the main objectives in establishing this database is to provide a wide set of measures of fi rm outcomes and structures that are comparable across countries. The database is mainly a stratifi ed sampling of fi rms from a representative sample provided by the national statistical offi ces. If this is not available, stratifi cation is done on a randomly drawn sample. Sample stratifi cation is based on having a third of the data be represented by each size group. Representation of several sectors was also an objective. 
Questions on Obstacles
The main question on obstacles is: Do you think the following (X) present any obstacle to the current operations of your establishment? The answers 6. The World Bank also surveys Brazil, China, and Turkey. However, the structure of those surveys is too diff erent from that of the African surveys to allow us to make comparisons.
7. The World Bank provides sample selection notes giving detailed information on sampling methodologies for the Enterprise Surveys. Some notes are available at http:// www .enterprise surveys .org/ . Details for the Africa sample are available from the authors by request, but sample selection notes are not available for Germany, India, Ireland, South Korea, and Spain. are no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obstacle, major obstacle, and very severe obstacle, which are assigned the numerical values 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. We have averaged answers to the question stated above into four groups: limited access to fi nance, weak infrastructure, weak law and order, and red tape. Weak infrastructure is the average of answers to this question where X is "electricity," "telecommunications," "transportation," and "access to land." Red tape is the average of answers to this question where X is "tax rates," "tax administration," "customs and trade regulations," "labor regulations," and "business licensing and permits." Weak law and order is the average of answers to this question where X is "functioning of the courts," "political instability," "corruption," "macroeconomic instability," "crime, theft, and disorder," and "practices of competitors in the informal sector." Weak law and order and red tape are coded such that higher values correspond to less law and order and more red tape. For Indian fi rms, the answers vary between 0 (no obstacle), 1 (minor obstacle), 2 (moderate obstacle), 3 (major obstacle), and 4 (very severe obstacle).
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Construction of Misallocation Measures
The variables we use from the Investment Climate Survey are annual interest rates (self reported), sales, capital stock at current replacement cost, labor, total cost of materials and intermediate inputs, total capital income, and total cost of labor. Variables in domestic monetary values are converted into US dollars using the annual exchange rates from World Development Indicators. 8 The defi nitions are as follows:
• Annual nominal interest rate (R): For annual nominal interest rates, we directly use the information on interest rates paid on loans.
9
• Annual real interest rate: To calculate real interest rates, we subtract infl ation of the year the surveys are conducted. The infl ation rate, obtained from the International Monetary Fund, is the annual percent change in consumer prices.
• Value added (Y): Value added is constructed as total sales minus total cost of raw materials and intermediate goods used in production.
• Replacement cost value of capital stock (K): Historical cost of replacing all machinery and equipment with new machines.
• Labor measure (L): We use information on the total number of full-time permanent employees at the end of the survey year to proxy labor used in the production process. Permanent employees are defi ned as all paid employees that work eight or more hours per day with a contract for a • Total cost of labor (wL): Includes wages, salaries, bonuses, and social payments.
• Total capital income (RK): We multiply the replacement cost of capital (K) with R, which is taken as 15 percent. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use a value of 10 percent, but because the average nominal interest rate for our African sample is about 15 percent, we choose this higher value. For our benchmark samples, the average nominal interest rates are given in table 5.3.
Using the above variables, we calculate two measures of misallocation previously used in the literature. We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and outline the pertinent features of their model here.
Assume that aggregate output (or, in Hsieh and Klenow, sectoral output) is a CES index of diff erentiated outputs of fi rms i = 1,..., M; that is,
, with the production of each diff erentiated product given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
where A i is fi rm-level TFP, K i is capital input, and L i is labor. Profi ts are
where P i is the price of output and R is the rental price of capital; τ yi is an output distortion, such as a tax on fi rm i's output, which does not aff ect the relative choice of capital and labor; τ yi is allowed to vary by fi rm and is intended to capture distortions such as corruption or any other impediment to production of fi rm i, which aff ects output but is not tied to capital or labor; and τ Ki captures access to credit. A positive value indicates that a fi rm pays a higher cost of capital than the offi cial interest rate R, for example, because the fi rm only has access to informal credit at high rates. Profi t maximization gives price as a markup over marginal cost:
which refl ects the relative capital/ labor distortion. The marginal revenue product of capital (denoted MRPK) is
which is larger, the larger the output distortion and the larger the capital/ labor distortion. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 Based on these considerations, we use the following measures of misallocation 1. MPK:
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This measure corresponds to equation (2) for σ = ∞, the case of perfect competition. The scaling of P i Y i /K i by any constant will not aff ect our regressions, where we use the logarithm of MPK, and aff ects only the descriptive statistics where we focus on the dispersion, rather than the level, of MPK. Because we do not know what would be a suitable value of σ in our sample, we use the perfect competition benchmark.
2. Hsieh and Klenow Measure (HK): For α = 1/3, we calculate the index introduced by Hsieh and Klenow as (4)
This measure directly refl ects the relative capital distortion because it, under the assumptions of Hsieh and Klenow's model, directly measures 1 + τK i as can be seen from equation (1).
Sample Selection Criteria
In our analysis, we use manufacturing fi rms and limit ourselves to countries with at least thirty-fi ve fi rms having observations on nominal interest rates. Thus, the baseline sample comprises ten African countries with 4,039 fi rms, Germany with 221 fi rms, India with 2,286 fi rms, Ireland with 175 fi rms, South Korea with 215 fi rms, and Spain with 134 fi rms.
We apply the following sample selection criteria to all fi rms in the baseline sample:
• We drop fi rms with missing information on key variables such as value added, capital stock, and labor.
• We drop government-owned fi rms.
• We drop fi rms with negative age, which is calculated as the diff erence of the corresponding year that the fi rm is surveyed and its date of establishment. Thus, if age is negative, we treat the date of establishment as faulty.
• We drop fi rms with negative values of sales, capital stock, labor, total cost of raw materials and intermediate goods.
• We drop fi rms whose replacement cost of capital stock is zero and whose replacement cost is bigger than the net book value of capital.
• We drop fi rms below the 1 percent and above the 99 percent tails of replacement cost value of capital stock. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 In the fi nal sample, the total number of fi rms in African countries (Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) is 3,908. The fi nal sample has 168 German fi rms, 2,129 Indian fi rms, 140 Irish fi rms, 178 South Korean fi rms, and 114 Spanish fi rms.
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Country-Level Data
Our country-level broad institutional measures come from the ICRG Researcher Dataset and World Bank Doing Business databases.
The fi rst mentioned data set collects political information and fi nancial and economic data, converting these into risk points for each individual risk component on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation. The political risk components are "government stability," "socioeconomic conditions," "investment profi le," "external confl ict," "internal confl ict," "corruption," "military in politics," "religious tensions," " weak law and order," "ethnic tensions," "democratic accountability," and "bureaucracy quality." The main variables used from this data set are corruption" and "investment profi le.
The second data set provides quantitative measures of regulations regarding starting a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a business. The main variable we use from this data set is "registering property (days)."
• Registering property: The number of days it takes to register property that an entrepreneur wants to purchase.
• Corruption: This is a measure that assesses actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, "favors for favors," and secret party funding. Larger values of the index indicate higher risk of conducting business ineff ectively.
• Investment profi le: This is an assessment of factors aff ecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic, and fi nancial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of zero points. A score of four points indicates very low risk and a score of zero indicates very high risk. The subcomponents are "contract viability/ expropriation," "profi ts," "repatriation," and "payment delays." Larger values of the index indicate higher risk of expropriation, payment delays, and so forth.
Empirical Analysis
The Extent of Capital Misallocation
In 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia). These statistics are calculated for each country and then averaged. We display statistics for Ghana separately andfor comparison to emerging and developing countries-Germany, India, Ireland, South Korea, and Spain. The table displays nominal and real interest rates, the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio, the logarithm of the MPK, and the logarithm of the Hsieh-Klenow HK-index. We choose to show the variables in logarithmic form, where the variables are close to normally distributed, because this is how they are used in the regression analysis.
For the African countries, nominal interest rates have a mean of 15.3 with a standard deviation of 6.1, have minimum and maximum values of 0 and 50, respectively, and exhibit high kurtosis (compared with the value of 3 for the normal distribution). Real interest rates have a mean of 8.7 percent, a standard deviation of 6.2, a minimum of -11.6, and a maximum of 44.4. Infl ation rates may diff er widely between rural and urban areas, and in either event such negative, numerically large, real rates are suspicious, so we will focus on nominal interest rates-see Deaton and Heston (2010) for some issues in measuring price levels in developing countries. It is hard to know what is the optimal level of the interest rate in these countries, but large variation in interest rates indicates suboptimal allocation of capital. Ghana seems fairly similar to other African countries, with a large standard deviation of nominal interest rates at 7.3. Szabo (2011) points out that family loans in Ghana are quite common and often carry very small nominal interest rates, and combined with the very high interest rates in the informal market pointed out earlier, this helps explain the enormous spread in interest rates. Interest rates display similar large spreads within India (standard deviation of 6.3) while they are much less dispersed, with standard deviations at 2.9 and below in the developed countries Germany, Ireland, South Korea, and Spain. This indicates that the large spreads observed in Africa do not refl ect actuarially fair risk premiums.
Capital-labor ratios are approximately log-normally distributed with the log-ratio having a kurtosis of about 3 in Africa. If capital is effi ciently allocated, all fi rms have the same MPK but, obviously, our MPK measures are estimated under highly simplifying conditions and therefore estimated MPKs will vary, maybe due to the simplifying conditions. In order to evaluate if the variation in the MPKs indicates bad allocation of capital, we compare to the spread in estimated MPKs in developed countries. We fi nd low standard deviations of log-MPK of about 1 in developed countries versus 1.4 for the African sample (1.5 for Ghana) and 1.6 for India, indicating misallocation in Africa (and India). The HK-measure takes a theoretical value of unity under effi cient allocation and this measure also displays signifi cantly higher variation in Africa and India (due to lack of data, this index is not available for Germany and South Korea). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 by type of fi rm. Large fi rms have more capital per worker and pay lower interest rates and this holds even more for listed fi rms. Similarly, exporting and foreign-owned fi rms have more capital relative to labor, while foreignowned fi rms pay slightly lower interest rates. There is also less dispersion of interest rates within the group of listed fi rms, indicating less misallocation of capital within this group of fi rms.
We next study these indicators in graphical form where more information can be shown compactly by country. Figure 5 .1, panel (a) displays infl ation and the mean and standard deviation of nominal interest rates for South Korea, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Burundi, Kenya, South Africa, Senegal, Botswana, India, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia, in this order, where we have ordered the countries by the standard deviation of interest rates from low to high. Among the African countries, Burundi displays the lowest variation in interest rates, followed by Kenya and South 18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 Africa, while Zambia has the highest spread, followed by Tanzania, Ghana, and Uganda. Developed countries have much lower variation in interest rates. Figure 5 .1, panel (b) shows box plots for the distribution of interest rates (albeit with extreme outliers removed). The main "box" of data for each country shows the range of the 25-75 percentiles. Such plots will reveal if the standard deviations are mainly caused by outliers. Visually, if a low interest rate combined with a low 25-75 spread is considered healthy, as we think it should be, Kenya and South Africa (as well as the developed countries) have the best distribution, while the distributions of interest rates within Zambia, Nigeria, and Ghana are less good. Figure 5 .2, panels (a) and (b) display the spread of our two misallocation measures, the MPK and HK indices, respectively. "Spread" is defi ned as the absolute distance to the country median. Burundi, Botswana, and Nigeria have large spreads in the MPK and, less strongly, in the HK index. The HKindex has very large spreads for Spain and Ireland, which indicates that a high spread of this measure may be driven by outliers and, therefore, may not be a good indicator of misallocation. Figure 5 .3 displays self-reported obstacles to growth for the African countries. Typically, access to fi nance plays the leading role with over 60 percent of all fi rms mentioning access to fi nance as a major obstacle in Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. In South Africa less than 15 percent of fi rms mention fi nance, while the number is about 40 percent in Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania, 50 percent in Senegal, and 30 percent in Zambia. Weak infrastructure is typically mentioned by about 30-35 percent of the fi rms, although the number is much lower for Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia. Law and order is a problem for 10-20 percent of fi rms, although the number is higher in Burundi and Kenya. Finally, red tape is mentioned by about 15-20 percent of fi rms in most countries with a very low number in South Africa. In Kenya, 35 percent of fi rms point to red tape-Kenya stands out in these fi gures as having a signifi cant amount of fi rms mentioning each of the main obstacles, while most other countries have fi nance dominating other obstacles.
Misallocation, Country-Level Institutions, and Investment Climate
We next turn to the broader policy question of whether good institutions are relevant for performance at the fi rm level. Our broad institutional variables capture protection of investor rights measured as corruption, the general investment climate, measured as the risk factors aff ecting the investment and ease of doing business, measured as the days it takes to register a property. These variables are quite correlated among themselves and we show their correlations with the MPK index in fi gure 5.4 and with the HK index in fi gure 5.5.
In fi gure 5.4, panel (a), we see a positive relation between misallocation, 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
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Fig. 5.2 The distribution of misallocation measures
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) display box plots for the distribution of the MPK spread and the HK-index spread, respectively. The spread is the absolute value of the diff erence between the fi rm-level value of the corresponding variable and its country-level median. In panel (a), the misallocation measure MPK, is calculated as α = Y/K where Y is value added and K is replacement cost of capital. In panel (b), the misallocation measure, the HK-index, is calculated as
/wL] where wL and wL stand for total cost of labor and capital, respectively. German and South Korean fi rms do not provide information on WL, thus the HK-index is not calculated for those fi rms. In both panels, countries are ranked according to the standard deviation of annual nominal interest rates and outside values are excluded. An outside value is defi ned as a value that is smaller than the lower quartile minus 1.5 times the interquartile range or larger than the upper quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 44
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Fig. 5.3 Major obstacle fi gures
Notes: Limited access to fi nance, weak infrastructure, weak law and order, and red tape represent the major obstacle groups that establishments face during their operation. The measures are constructed using answers to the question "Do you think that . . . presents any obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?" For example, in the case of limited access to fi nance, the question is as follows: "Do you think that limited access to fi nance presents any obstacle to the current operation of your establishment?" Answers to these questions can be no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obstacle, major obstacle, and very severe obstacle, which are coded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The way we construct our measure of limited access to fi nance is as follows: We take the number of establishments that answered the question "Do you think that limited access to fi nance presents any obstacle to the current operation of your establishment?" as "major obstacle and very severe obstacle" and divide by the total number of establishments that answered the question. Hence, our measures represent the percentage of establishments that consider limited access to fi nance a very important obstacle for their operations. In the case of weak infrastructure, the questions are "Do you think that electricity, telecommunication, transportation, or access to land presents a major/ severe obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?" In the case of red tape, the questions we use are "Do you think that tax rates, tax administration, customs and trade regulations, labor regulations, or business licensing and permits present a major/ severe obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?" In the case of weak law and order, the questions are "Do you think that the functioning of the courts, political instability, corruption, macroeconomic instability, crime, theft and disorder, or practices of competitors in the informal sector present major/ severe obstacles to the current operations of your establishment?" 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 44 Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 44 Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
Fig. 5.4 The relationship between misallocation (MPK) and institutional variables
Notes: Panels (a), (b), and (c) display cross-country correlation plots of the (country) average log(MPK) against the country-level measures property registration (days), investment profi le, and corruption, respectively. Log(MPK) is the logarithm of MPK, which is calculated as ADD EQUATION where Y is value added and K is replacement value of capital. Property registration is the number of days it takes to register a property that an entrepreneur wants to purchase. Investment profi le is an assessment of factors aff ecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic, or fi nancial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: contract viability/ expropriation, profi ts repatriation, and Payment delays. As that index value increases, the risk of expropriation, payment delays, and so forth, increases. Corruption is a measure that assesses actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, "favors for favors," and secret party funding. As that index value increases, the risk of conducting business ineff ectively increases. See the data section for detailed explanations.
N.B..: Reduced fi gures 5.4 and 5.5 to fi t on page with legend; had to set legend wider than fi gure to fi t within 30 pica maximum width. OK as done? Or set image fl ush left over legend?
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 measured by average log(MPK), and registering property. This implies that the longer it takes to register a property, the higher is misallocation. The implication is that informal lending or retained earnings do not make up for the impediments to formal credit. We see a negative slope for the relation between the (country-mean) level of misallocation and the index for investment profi le in fi gure 5.4, panel (b). Figure 5.4, panel (c) , which uses an index for corruption on the X-axis, is very similar. This means that countries with a better investment climate (lower expropriation risk/ corruption) have lower levels of capital misallocation on average, which is consistent with the patterns found by Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) : fi rms are not likely to reinvest profi ts when property rights (broadly defi ned) are weak. For example, according to our fi eld study, we would not expect mango producers in northern Ghana to reinvest profi ts to increase production for shipping to Accra, because profi ts would be exhausted by bribes at road checkpoints. The picture is the same for the HK index, as shown in fi gure 5.5. We proceed with fi rm-level determinants of the misallocation.
Misallocation and Access to Finance: Firm-Level Evidence
In this section, we investigate the role of various constraints faced by fi rms in explaining misallocation. Table 5 .4 gives descriptive statistics for obstacles averaged into four groups: limited access to fi nance, weak infrastructure, weak law and order, and red tape, as described earlier. Table 5 .4 shows that for African countries and Ghana the most serious obstacle is limited access to fi nance, which has the highest mean, followed by weak infrastructure. Developed countries have lower means in general for all the obstacles. In developed countries, limited access to fi nance seems to be equivalent to weak infrastructure for developing countries in terms of importance of obstacles (India is left out of this table because the answers to the questions are scored on a diff erent scale).
In table 5.5, we use ordinary least squares (OLS)-regressions to examine determinants of misallocation using log-MPK as the dependent variable. The MPK is equalized across fi rms under ideal conditions, so in the absence of distortions all regressors should be insignifi cant and no fi rm-level obstacle should signifi cantly predict MPK. We interpret positive signifi cant values as determinants of capital market distortions relative to labor market distortions. This is because higher MPK of a fi rm as a result of a certain obstacle indicates that relatively little capital was allocated to that fi rm. We fi nd in column (1) that limited access to fi nance and weak infrastructure are insignifi cantly correlated with distortions, while the MPK is negative and signifi cantly correlated with weak law and order and red tape. The coeffi cient of -9.3 to weak law and order implies that an increase of one unit in the weak law and order index (moving from, say, "no obstacle" to "minor obstacle") is associated with a 9.3 percent increase in distortion in the direction of having too much capital relative to labor. That is, the negative coeffi cient Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only We average answers to questions about obstacles into four groups: limited access to fi nance, weak infrastructure, weak law and order, and red tape. The basic obstacle measure is the response to the question "Do you think that X presents any obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?" where X represents various questions whose answers are averaged into these four groups. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), 4 (major obstacle), and 5 (very severe obstacle). Weak infrastructure is composed of the following Xs: electricity, telecommunications, transportation, and access to land. Red tape is composed of the following Xs: tax rates, tax administration, customs and trade regulations, labor regulations, and business licensing and permits. Weak law and order is composed of the following Xs: functioning of the courts; political instability; corruption; macroeconomic instability; crime, theft, and disorder; and practices of competitors in the informal sector. Limited access to fi nance is a stand alone question that represents a single X. Weak law and order and red tape are coded such that higher values correspond to less law and order and more red tape. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 implies that the MPK is lower when law and order is lacking, indicating that it correlates more with labor market than with capital market distortions (see equation [2] ).
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Column (2) adds industry dummies and column (3) adds age, size, and export status of the fi rm. Small fi rms have lower MPKs, meaning higher distortions. This implies that aggregate effi ciency could be improved by moving capital to larger, more effi cient fi rms. Limited access to fi nance now matters for exporting fi rms; such fi rms have lower returns and more distortions if Notes: See notes to the previous tables for variable explanations. The interaction variables are constructed by the multiplication of (Export -Export) with (X -X ), where X refers to an obstacle group and X refers to the mean of the corresponding variable over all fi rms. Export is a dummy, which indicates fi rms whose percentage of direct exports to total sales exceed 50. The Africa sample comprises Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The Europe sample comprises Germany, Ireland, and Spain. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. **Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. *Signifi cant at the 10 percent level. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 their access to fi nance is limited. Column (4) drops country dummies. The coeffi cient of limited access to fi nance becomes signifi cant in column (4), which implies that limited access to fi nance in particular explains diff erences in MPK between countries. Limited access to fi nance is not signifi cant for developed countries nor for India, even without the country eff ects.
Weak infrastructure is signifi cant when we omit the country dummies in column (4), suggesting that this variable in particular explains cross-country diff erences in MPK. This variable has strong explanatory power for MPK diff erences within India, but is insignifi cant for Korea and Europe. The coeffi cient to weak infrastructure is positive, indicating that fi rms invest less in physical capital when infrastructure is lacking. The coeffi cient to red tape also is negative in column (4), indicating that cumbersome bureaucracy is important in explaining diff erences in MPK across African countries as well as within countries (recall that a negative coeffi cient means lower MPK and so higher distortions). The coeffi cient to this variable is signifi cantly positive for India and Europe, possibly due to high tax rates and a high degree of bureaucracy discouraging investment, although we do not further explore what underlies this. For Africa, the coeffi cient to red tape is negative, indicating labor market distortion, and it is possible that labor distortions stem from rules such as those imposing minimum numbers of local employees that we described for the case study of Ghana-such rules would likely be referred to as red tape in the surveys.
As in column (3), when we include interaction terms, we see that the sign for exporting fi rms interacted with limited access to fi nance is negative in all columns (not signifi cant for India and positive for Europe). The interpretation of this is that nonexporting fi rms are relatively highly aff ected by imperfections in fi nancial markets, leading to high MPKs consistent with such fi rms having too low a capital/ labor ration relative to exporting fi rmspossibly, exporting fi rms are able to raise funds through long-term relations with foreign customers. The other interactions are not signifi cant for the African sample on which we focus. Table 5 .6 repeats the same exercise using the Hsieh-Klenow index. The HK-index takes a high value in the case of capital distortions (too low capital) and a negative value in the case of labor distortions (too little labor compensation). In contrast to the MPK-measure of table 5.5, it relies on labor costs being correctly measured. A natural fi rst hypothesis is that imperfect fi nancial markets lead to capital distortions, and the estimated coeffi cient to limited access to fi nance in column (1) confi rms this with a very high level of signifi cance. The coeffi cient indicates that a fi rm that moves from, say, "no obstacle" to "minor" obstacle, will have 11 percent higher capital distortion (while moving from "no obstacle" to "very severe obstacle" increases capital distortions by 44.4 percent). Red tape has a negative coeffi cient, implying that bureaucracy leads to higher labor distortion relative to capital distortions (the opposite holds for India, where capital distortions seems to be Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 more important). In column (4), we see that for exporters, a high value of limited access to fi nance implies less relative capital distortion compared to nonexporters. Red tape in particular explains diff erences between countries as can be seen from the larger coeffi cient when country dummies are dropped. The interaction eff ects for exporters reveal negative coeffi cients, meaning for exporters limited access to fi nance leads to more labor distor- Notes: See notes to the previous tables for variable explanations. The interaction variables are constructed by the multiplication of (Export -Export) with (X -X ) where X refers to an obstacle group and X refers to the mean of the corresponding variable over all fi rms. Export is a dummy that indicates fi rms with percentage of direct exports to total sales greater than 50. The Africa sample comprises Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The Europe sample comprises Ireland and Spain. Because German and South Korean fi rms are not asked to provide information on total cost of labor, the HK-index measure cannot be calculated. Standard errors are robust and tstatistics are reported in parentheses. ***Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. **Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. *Signifi cant at the 10 percent level. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 tions, though column (4) suggests this pattern might be driven by country diff erences.
Overall, the patterns of table 5.6 are quite similar to those of table 5.5, which indicates that the obstacles we consider distorts capital/ labor ratios, rather than output-if output distortions dominated, the regressors would be signifi cant in table 5.5 and insignifi cant in table 5.6 and not similar as in our results.
Conclusion
Using establishment-level survey data from the World Bank, we quantify the extent of misallocation within the manufacturing sector for ten African countries. To benchmark our results, we use similar data for India, another developing country, and developed countries such as Germany. Our main measures of misallocation are the MPK and an index suggested by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . Both measures reveal a great deal of capital misallocation in Africa and India and little misallocation in developed countries. Within Africa, capital markets appear to function relatively well in South Africa and, a little less so, in Kenya and Burundi, while Nigeria and Ghana display high levels of misallocation.
The fi rm-level regressions demonstrate that an important determinant of within-country misallocation is limited access to fi nance. The MPK is 45 percent higher in fi rms where access to fi nance is a serious problem compared to fi rms where access to fi nance is not a problem. Comparing mean levels of misallocation across countries, we fi nd that countries with higher risk of expropriation that is, lower degrees of property-right protection, display more misallocation. The within-country fi rm-level results and acrosscountry results both point to the importance of strong property rights and a well-functioning fi nancial system for the effi cient allocation of capital . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
